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So what have we learned from this latest round of fighting so far?

1. While the Iron Dome anti-rocket system is a big hit in battle with the relatively small Islamic Jihad group [it has frustrated their plans and provided the Israeli government with time and space not to launch a heavier assault on Gaza], it won’t stand up to a massive and sustained rocket barrage from the much larger, much more heavily-armed Hamas. Like King David and King Saul, Islamic Jihad has thousands of rockets, and Hamas has tens of thousands of rockets. If the Iron Dome won’t stand up to a massive and sustained rocket barrage from the relatively small Hamas terrorist group, it definitely won’t stand up to a massive and sustained rocket barrage from the Hezbollah terrorist group. If the Iron Dome won’t stand up to a massive and sustained rocket barrage from the relatively small Hezbollah terrorist group, it definitely won’t stand up to a massive and sustained rocket barrage from the Syrian army. The Iron Dome is a smart, but limited tool, effective only in a limited conflict.

2. In short, politicians’ call to produce more Iron Domes systems is cheap populist talk: the economies of scale and terror in these parts guarantee that Israel will never have enough Iron Domes to effectively protect its civilians from massive and sustained rocket attacks. Each Kassam and Grad rocket costs up to a thousand dollars and every Iron Dome interceptor missile fired at a Grad costs 40,000 dollars. We’ll spend ourselves into a recession and still not have enough interceptors. It costs $45 million to produce an Iron Dome battery. You do the math. While it’s a lifesaver for many people in the south now, it won’t deliver bang for its buck in a larger battle. It’s unsustainable.

3. Iron Dome batteries are effective for small-scale battles against small terror groups like the Popular Resistance Committees and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They are not effective against large terror groups and armies with tens of thousands of rockets in their arsenals. To deal with these threats, Israel has to strike in a way that makes it not cost-effective for the other side to fire its rockets. And that means that, apart from striking very hard at the terrorist leadership and infrastructure, the IDF has to sow massive damage to the civilian infrastructure of the areas under the control of the terror groups until they are unable to care for the civilians under their aegis. In any case, Hezbollah and Hamas fire from within civilian areas using them as human shields, and are thus forfeiting their lives. But this obviously then, puts Israel in a no-win situation: it creates a humanitarian disaster in Gaza and southern Lebanon, brings down world condemnation, and is forced into a ceasefire before it can exact a steep enough price from the enemy. Israel is then forced into a shape it doesn’t want to get into, like chasing rocket squads in built-up areas – which is the kind of warfare Hamas and Hezbollah want to drag the IDF into.

4. The mantra from the government and the IDF is that the resilience of the home front is the wind in the sails of the fighting armed forces. If that is truly the case, then the constant reports coming in of damaged bomb shelters is very worrying. Every day we’re hearing reports of shelters without water, electricity, toilets and such amenities. Some shelters have been taken over by civilians and turned into storage rooms or being used as synagogues. The government, through the police and the local authorities, need to go to every single public bomb shelter and make sure it is open, equipped and ready for use. Otherwise expect chaos in the home front, and massive pressure on the government to bring any fighting to a sudden halt. READ MORE